



Expectation and Reliance: One Principle or Two? 
David Campbell* and Roger Halson† 
 
Elementary mathematics are used in this paper to clarify the ‘losing contract problem’ 
which continues to confuse courts addressing the quantification of damages for breach 
of contract. The distinction between gross receipts and net profits is analysed in a way 
which allows the coherent identification of the claimant’s expectation in all contracts, 
be they profitable, break-even or losing contracts. 
 
Introduction 
In this short article we seek to demonstrate that the use of elementary mathematics allows us 
to clarify the analysis of the ‘losing contract problem’ which continues to confuse courts and 
bedevil our understanding of the conceptual foundations of the quantification of damages for 
breach of contract.1 In the Commonwealth,2 this problem was brought to prominence by 
Professor Ogus’ comments in the early 70s3 on Anglia Television Ltd v Reed,4 and, as 
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Professor McLauchlan’s much more recent note5 on Omak Maritime Ltd v Mamola 
Challenger Shipping Co Ltd6 shows, it has not since been adequately understood, despite 
being the subject of extremely detailed examination of the principles and authorities in a 
number of subsequent cases, in particular Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty 
Ltd.7 
 The basis of the analysis of the losing contract problem remains Fuller and Perdue’s 
distinguishing of three interests protected by the remedies for breach of contract,8 though the 
clarification of the problem proposed here turns on recognising the primacy of the 
expectation interest in a way that cuts against the hierarchy of interests, or in Fuller’s own 
words the ‘scale of enforceability’,9 which Fuller and Perdue themselves put forward. Putting 
the restitution interest to one side, the expectation interest seeks to protect the profit which 
the claimant seeks to realise through performance of its obligations under the contract. The 
aim of protection of the expectation interest understood in this way is ‘to put the [claimant] in 
as good a position as he would have occupied had the defendant performed his promise’,10 
which is, of course, known in the Commonwealth as the principle in Robinson v Harman.11 
The reliance interest seeks to protect any investment the claimant made in (part-)performing 
its obligations. The aim of protecting the reliance interest ‘is to put [the claimant] in as good a 
position as he was in before the promise was made’.12 The losing contract problem is 
whether, when the claimant’s expectation interest is negative but its reliance interest is 
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positive, the negative expectation extinguishes or limits a reliance claim, or whether the 
claimant can avoid any such extinguishing or limiting effect by treating expectation and 
reliance as two distinct principles and electing to claim only the latter. As Lord Denning MR 
put it in Anglia TV:13  
It seems to me that a plaintiff in such a case as this has an election: he can either 
claim for loss of profits; or for his wasted expenditure. But he must elect between 
them. He cannot claim both. If he has not suffered any loss of profits - or if he 
cannot prove what his profits would have been - he can claim in the alternative 
the expenditure which has been thrown away, that is, wasted, by reason of the 
breach. 
 The main value that this article is intended to have, concision in the statement of its 
clarification of the losing contract problem, would be defeated by any attempt to fully 
consider what is now a sizeable case law and a large academic literature, or to deal with all 
the conceptual intricacies noted therein, and we will not do so, instead focusing on an 
illustrative, rather than exhaustive, review of cases that are indisputably part of the, as it 
were, losing contract canon. In addition to Anglia TV, we will give particular consideration to 
another controversial case, Cullinane v British ‘Rema’ Manufacturing Co,14 and hopefully 
provide the means to resolve ‘the considerable problems posed by those cases’.15 It will 
become clear to the reader, however, that this note is in general stimulated by Ogus’ thinking, 
and that it addresses the central issue identified by Professor Treitel in his comment on 
Amann Aviation: whether the losing contract problem involves one principle of expectation, 
to which the protection of reliance is always subordinate, or two principles of expectation and 
reliance, between which the claimant may elect.16 McLauchlan’s note on Omak further 
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captures the degree of confusion, both conceptual and semantic, which still attends the 
consideration of this issue. 
 The clarification of the losing contract problem proposed here lies in the universal 
application of the ‘second method’ McLauchlan sets out, which was proposed by Mason CJ 
and Dawson J in Amann Aviation17 and noted in what has been called Teare J’s ‘masterly 
judgment’18 in Omak.19 This method ‘is simply to add the amount of wasted expenditure to 
the net profit that would have resulted from full performance’,20 and it turns on 
conceptualising expectation as net profits. Such a methodology has been canvassed 
throughout the Commonwealth discussion of the losing contract problem,21 and so in this 
sense we make little claim for innovation in this article. But we nevertheless believe that the 
clarity of the formulation of this method is novel and of value. And we do hope additionally 
to show that the argument for adopting this second method, based on net profit, involves 
simultaneous acknowledgement of the considerations which have, in contrast, sometimes led 
to the conceptualisation of expectation, not as net profits, but as gross receipts. For in the end, 




Let us consider the hypothetical case of an agreement to sell 100 tonnes of generic steel 
sheets for a price of £1 million, delivery to be made at the buyer’s premises 6 months after 
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the date of the agreement. The seller anticipates that the steel will cost £900,000 to 
manufacture and deliver. The buyer intends to use the steel to produce corrugated roofing for 
retail sale. 
 Let us define the expectation interest as net profit. In our case the seller’s net profit is 
the gross receipts from the sale, ie the contract price, minus the cost of manufacture and 
delivery, ie £1 million - £900,000 = £100,000. The buyer’s net profit is the gross receipts 
from the retail sale of the roofing minus the cost of manufacture and distribution of the 
roofing, of which the contract price of the steel is part. 
 Let us define the reliance interest as such investment the parties may make (part-) 
performing their obligations which, by virtue of the breach, is wasted.22 Whereas it is 
analytically the case that an expectation interest must arise in every contract (even if it later 
can be shown to be zero or negative), it is a purely empirical issue whether a reliance interest 
arises. In our case, if the buyer repudiates sufficiently early,23 the seller’s reliance interest 
may be zero as the breach came before the seller made any investment in performance. On 
the other hand (and for the present ignoring mitigation), if the seller delivers the goods and 
the buyer does not pay, the reliance interest is the full cost of manufacture and delivery. All 
forms of intermediate position may arise depending on empirical circumstances of which the 
time of the breach is the most important. 
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 If we let e = expectation interest, cp = cost of production (manufacture, delivery, retail 
distribution, etc), gr = gross receipts24 and r = reliance interest, we may set out these concepts 
in simple algebraic form: 
(1) e = gr – cp 
(2) r ≤ cp25 
 
Distinguishing the Compensation of Breaches of Contracts with Three 
Different Results 
The profitable contract 
Let us now distinguish three possible results of a contractual investment: the profitable, the 
break-even and the losing contract. All commercial parties enter into a contract in the belief 
that they will realise a profit, ie that e > 0. If that contract is breached, observance of the 
principle in Robinson v Harman will require damages to be quantified in what appear to be 
one of two different ways depending on whether the claimant has made an investment in 
reliance. If such an investment has not been made, then this is a ‘wholly executory contract’ 
for breach of which contractual damages are equal to e.26 But, as we shall see, it would be 
highly misleading in this context to regard this as an award of ‘pure expectation’ damages. If 
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the claimant has made an investment in reliance, then to e must be added r, and this will be 
called ‘combined damages’.27 
 The conceptual and semantic clarification which this article attempts to make turns on 
showing that the distinction between pure expectation and combined damages is in an 
important sense illusory. If we let d = contractual damages, then the universal formula for the 
quantification of such damages is: 
(3) d = e + r 
In what appears to be an award of pure expectation damages: 
(4) d = e (e > 0) + r (r = 0) 
In the case of combined damages: 
(5) d = e (e > 0) + r (r > 0) 
One way of expressing this result is to say that there is no such thing as pure expectation 
damages. The point that has seemingly eluded some judges but which this note, amongst 
other contributions, seeks to emphasise correct is that in all cases the reliance interest is 
present and all awards of contractual damages are therefore awards of combined damages. It 
is just that, in some empirical circumstances, r = 0. It must be understood that the addition of 
zero to a quantity does not alter that quantity. 
 
The break-even contract 
In our hypothetical case, it may transpire that gr = cp so that e = 0. This is the break-even 
contract in which gross receipts amortise expenditure but leave no net profit. In our 
hypothetical case, the buyer’s anticipated level of sales of roofing may not be achievable and 
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the buyer is reduced to the position where the sales it does make only amortise the investment 
it has made in manufacturing and distributing the roofing. Equally, the seller’s costs of 
manufacture and delivery of the steel may rise so as to equal the contract price. If the seller 
breaches in the first situation, or the buyer breaches in the second, contractual damages will 
return the claimant to the position it was in prior to the contract being agreed. 
 The magnitude of r being only indirectly related to the magnitude of cp, it is possible 
that, in the circumstances of the case, r = 0 and no substantial damages will arise. We may 
express this as: 
(6) d = e (e = 0) + r (r = 0) = 0 
This represents an award of combined damages, but of a purely theoretical sort, for no claim 
will be made.  
 But if r > 0, even though e = 0, a claim for substantial damages may arise. This case, in 
which it appears that the claim is for reliance only, is the obverse of apparently pure 
expectation damages, and, by analogy it is tempting to call it an award of ‘pure reliance’ 
damages.28 But this would again be misleading as this also is an award of combined damages, 
though e = 0. We may express this as: 
(7) d = e (e = 0) + r (r > 0) 
 
The losing contract 
In our hypothetical case, it may also transpire that gr < cp so that e < 0. This is the losing 
contract, in which gross receipts would not even amortise the cost of production and so leave, 
not a net profit, but a net loss or negative expectation.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 




 In this case, as in the break-even contract, it is possible that, in the circumstances of the 
case, r = 0, and, if so, again no claim for substantial damages will arise. We may express this 
as: 
(8) d = e (e < 0) + r (r = 0) = 0 
As in the break even case, this also is a combined award of a purely theoretical sort, for no 
claim will be made. 
 But, again, if r > 0, a claim for substantial damages may be contemplated, so that: 
(9) d = e (e < 0) + r (r > 0) 
The losing contract problem is, of course, that an award of ‘reliance in the alternative’ would 
both be inconsistent with the principle in Robinson v Harman and raise policy issues about 
the (partial) ‘reversal’ of the allocation of risk under the contract that are very familiar but 
nonetheless very significant. Awarding ‘reliance in the alternative’ would not protect the 
claimant’s original expectation of profit, but it would shield the claimant from actual loss. If, 
in our hypothetical example, the seller’s cost of production had, because of unanticipated 
major increases in the cost of the steel stock from which sheets are rolled, risen to £1.1 
million, then, following repudiation by the buyer, the seller’s expectation would be  
-£100,000. If following repudiation by the buyer when the seller had expended £100,000 on 
manufacture of the steel, the seller’s damages would be zero. This can be expressed as 
follows:  
seller’s e = (gr (£1 million) – cp (£1.1 million)) = -£100,000 
∴ seller’s d = (e (-£100,000) + r (£100,000)) = £0 
 Equally, if the buyer’s expectation of consequential profit falls because of a lower retail 
demand for the roofing, a similar calculation can be made in respect of a seller’s breach after 




 Of course, all these variables can be altered, and, in particular, it should be repeated that 
where the magnitude of r falls within the range set by r ≤ cp is a merely empirical matter. 
But, given that these are matters of litigation rather than purely blackboard calculation, d can, 
of course, never fall below 0.  
 In sum, then, the range of possibilities in which litigation may be contemplated, all of 
which may be reduced to d = e + r, is: 
(4) d = e (e > 0) + r (r = 0) profitable contract when r = 0 
(5) d = e (e > 0) + r ( r > 0) profitable contract when r > 0 
(7) d = e (e = 0) + r (r > 0) break-even contract when r > 0 
(9) d = e (e < 0) + r (r > 0) losing contract when r > 0.  
 How identifying this range of possibilities, and the universality of d = e + r, helps us to 
analyse the losing contract problem is best discussed by turning directly to some of the 
decided cases of the losing contract canon.  
 
4. Application to Decided Break-even and Losing Contract Cases 
The result of the argument so far is that all awards of contract damages should be seen as 
combined awards of expectation and reliance, bearing in mind that expectation is defined as 
net profit and that the addition of zero to a quantity does not alter that quantity. The universal 
formula for contract damages is, to repeat: 
(3) d = e + r 
 In light of this, the statement by Lord Denning quoted previously29 can be seen to be 
misleading in two ways, though we shall defer discussion of the second. Saying that the 
claimant ‘can claim in the alternative the expenditure which has been thrown away, that is, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 




wasted, by reason of the breach’ is, with respect, wrong. There is no possibility of claiming 
‘in the alternative’. On the analysis put forward here, the claimant in Anglia TV sought 
combined damages, but e = 0. It will be recalled that, after the defendant in Anglia TV 
repudiated an obligation to act in a tv play, the claimant terminated and sought damages. 
Faced with difficulties of uncertainty in quantification, the claimant did not claim for ‘lost 
profits’ but confined itself to ‘wasted expenditure’.30 The claimant, unable to prove ‘lost 
profits’, was understood by Lord Denning not to claim expectation at all but, ‘in the 
alternative’, reliance. However, just as the claimant did not seek to claim e, crucially neither 
did the defendant seek to show that e < 0, ie that the claimant’s expectation was negative. 
This therefore was, on the pleadings, actually not a case of claiming reliance in the alternative 
but a break-even case in which: 
(7) d = e (e = 0) + r (r > 0) 
This appears to be pure reliance damages, but this is exactly what it is not. As was made clear 
in CCC Films (London) Ltd v Impact Quadrant Films Ltd,31 in Anglia TV it was ‘assumed 
that the plaintiffs would, had they made the film, at least have recouped their expenditure’. 
The confusion arising from Anglia TV stems from the fact that Lord Denning did not realise 
that he was making this assumption. 
 That this assumption was essential to the conclusion in Anglia TV was shown in C and 
P Haulage v Middleton,32 in which a claimant who sought damages for wasted expenditures 
was confined to nominal damages because C and P Haulage was treated as a losing contract 
case, an instance of: 
 (9) d = e (e < 0) + r (r > 0) 
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As it happens, C and P Haulage was per incuriam because it was on the reported facts wrong 
to treat it as a losing contract case.33 But, putting this to one side, to hold that the negative 
expectation should have had an influence on the reliance award was correct in principle. And 
this makes it clear why it is essential to see that reliance played an indispensable, if 
unfortunately silent, role in Anglia TV. The assumption that e = 0 allowed r to be awarded. 
This is entirely correct. What was wrong was that the assumption that e = 0 was left unclear. 
It should have been a finding, or at least an acknowledged assumption, and explaining this is 
the contribution of CCC Films, supported by Amann Aviation in particular.34 
As C and P Haulage was not on the reported facts shown to be a losing contract, even 
if we try to build on its correct statement of principle we must be left with the live question 
whether a negative expectation, whatever its size, completely extinguishes a positive reliance 
claim or whether it merely limits the reliance award. If e = -£100,000, does this mean that 
nothing will be awarded if r = £200,000, or will £100,000 be awarded?35 On the basis of 
Robinson v Harman, logically and in terms of policy, the latter alternative should be 
preferred; indeed, there is no logical basis for the former. There may be practical issues of 
quantification which stand in the way of this alternative. This article seeks merely to clarify 
the conceptual issues and we take no position on this question.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
33 R D Taylor, ‘C and P Haulage v Middleton (CA)’ (1984) 18 Law Teacher 217 at 218. 
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interesting way as in CCC Films. In Yam Seng [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1321 at [191]; [2013] EWHC 
111, Leggatt J said that ‘ITC has not attempted to discharge the burden of showing what financial return 
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assumption that some sales had taken place but was unable to quantify them. 
35 Despite the considered dicta of Berger J, the important Canadian case of Bowlay Logging Ltd v 
Domtar Ltd (1978) 87 DLR (3d) 325 (affd (1982) 135 DLR (3d) 179 ), which did involve a losing 
contract, does not help as much as it might in this respect as, by curious coincidence, the expectation loss 




5. Mitigation Taken Into Account in Break-even and Losing Contract 
Cases 
When no opportunity to mitigate arises, the analysis so far will be able to account for the 
foundation of quantification in all contracts, whether profitable, break-even or losing. But 
when such an opportunity does arise in break-even or losing contract cases, it gives rise to 
issues which merit discussion here. Our hypothetical case, turning on the sale of generic steel, 
is one which particularly invites mitigation, for when the goods are generic it is highly likely 
that there is a market in them; in the most practically important sense this is what the goods 
being generic means. Using the facts of that case, we will consider the positions of a claimant 
seller and a claimant buyer in turn. 
 Following buyer’s repudiation or wrongful rejection of deliverable steel, or steel which 
may be put into a deliverable state at a reasonable cost assessed in the context of mitigation, 
the possibility of resale arises, and if the resale price is lower than the contract price, the 
seller will be able to claim the difference as market damages. Regardless of whether the 
contract is a profitable, a break-even or a losing one, mitigation always, as it were, displaces 
the original expectation calculated as gr – cp = np and substitutes for this market damages.36 
But whereas in a profitable contract this would effectively restore the seller’s original 
expectation, it would alter it in a break-even or a losing contract. In a profitable contract, the 
mitigating seller resells at a price which, after payment of damages, is intended to match the 
original price.37 In a break-even or a losing contract, the payment of substantial market 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
36 The justification for this substitution, which, together with the corollary response to seller’s breach, is 
the paradigm of remedies for breach of contract is set out in D Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of 
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Texas Wesleyan L Rev 455. 
37 The shortcomings of the law of market damages which can lead to this intention not being realised are 





damages to a mitigating seller is a payment which will place the seller in a superior position 
to the one in which it would have been placed by performance, albeit that one speculates that 
the difference may well of little significance and the substantial market damages largely 
theoretical. 
 Following a seller’s repudiation or failure to deliver conforming goods when the 
contract is profitable for the buyer, the buyer will have to find a substitute for the steel, which 
we remind the reader is generic, and manufacture the roofing. If it does not do this in these 
circumstances, it cannot claim the consequential loss following from failure to sell the 
roofing. Mitigation means that the buyer’s damages are shifted from the consequential loss, 
which is avoided, to market damages, if any, representing the difference by which the market 
price exceeds the contract price. The buyer’s expectation is protected, but again in a way only 
remotely related – it perhaps is even better to say is unrelated - to its original expectation, 
which plays no part in quantification. 
 It is possible that in a break-even or losing contract, the award of substantial market 
damages to the buyer could, as with the seller, improve the buyer’s position by comparison to 
the original expectation of zero or less than zero, though again one speculates this may well 
be largely theoretical and of little significance. Nevertheless, as this improvement of the 
positions of the seller and the buyer would defeat the principle in Robinson v Harman, the 
question arises whether it is wise to allow such an outcome, and here we return to Omak. 
 In general, the understanding of the relationship between original expectation and 
expectation protected through mitigation is by no means entirely satisfactory. In Omak, the 
charterer unaccountably repudiated a charterparty when freight rates were rising. This 
allowed the owners to earn more over the remaining term of the charter than they would have 
 





earned had they performed their original obligation. The owner nevertheless claimed reliance 
losses incurred in making modifications to their vessel required for the specific purposes of 
the charterparty which were of no residual value. As, it would seem, the contract was agreed 
on the default understanding that d = e + r, and, whilst e = 0, r > 0, the correct outcome seems 
simple enough to us in terms of the issues considered here,38 but reliance damages were not 
awarded. 
 The problem in Omak was caused by the conduct of the charterers. In the circumstances 
of rising freight, the charterer wishing to be released from its obligations could and should, 
rather than breaching, have negotiated a release at no cost, or even have charged for releasing 
the owner. By not doing so, it seems to have acted irrationally and thereby to have created a 
situation which the relevant rules find it difficult to handle. Omak was not in fact a case 
which turned on the losing contract issue nor, in our opinion, on the relationship between the 
contractual interests generated by the contract between the parties at all. Rather, the principal 
confusion in the judgment stemmed from an inability, traceable to the British Westinghouse 
case39 but gravely exacerbated by The Golden Victory,40 to coherently relate to the original 
expectation the effect of steps taken after breach. This in the end is a question of whether the 
parties’ liabilities should be assessed according to what they could reasonably know at the 
time of their agreement or according to knowledge only the court could gain subsequently. 
To the authors of this article, who wish to, so far as possible, give effect to the intention of 
the parties, this seems to be a question hardly worth asking. But to courts which seem 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
38 And seems to have been similarly clear to the arbitrators, although their reliance on C and P Haulage 
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incapable of resisting the temptation to do justice41 it evidently is one which gives rise to 
serious difficulties. As these difficulties are irrelevant to the point we wish to clarify in this 
article, we put them to one side.  
 
6. Conclusion: One Principle and Two 
In this article we have sought by the use of elementary mathematics to clarify the analysis of 
the losing contract problem associated with Anglia TV v Reed. The claim that is the basis of 
the clarification is that, in all cases, regardless of whether the contract is profitable, break-
even or losing and regardless of whether the reliance claim is ≥ 0, contractual damages 
should be quantified as the sum of the compensatory damages necessary to protect the 
expectation interest and the compensatory damages necessary to protect the reliance interest, 
that is: 
(3) d = e + r 
It must, as we have said before, be borne in mind that expectation is defined as net profit and 
that the addition of zero to a quantity does not alter that quantity. 
 Even if this clarification is found to be of value, it hardly resolves all the problems of 
the quantification of damages on the basis of the three interests analysis. One problem 
remains of particular significance to us here. It is obvious – and Treitel’s comment on Amaan 
Aviation makes it particularly so – that in the cases in the losing contract canon ‘expectation’ 
has been used in (at least) two very different ways. One of these ways has been to describe 
the goal set out in Robinson v Harman, which we have seen Fuller and Perdue describe as: ‘to 
put the [claimant] in as good a position as he would have occupied had the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
41 N Andrews, ‘Civil Disgorgement of Wrongdoers’ Gains: The Temptation to do Justice’, in W R 





performed his promise’.42 This is what we will call the ‘overall’ concept of expectation. It is 
quite different to the net profit conception, upon the use of which in quantification we have 
so far insisted. But whereas correct quantification requires the use of the net profit 
conception, it has been argued that damages are always the sum of net profit and reliance and 
that the goal of quantification therefore should never be understood as ending with 
expectation in the sense of net profit. That goal, the Robinson v Harman goal, is, indeed, to 
lead to the overall concept of expectation, and it is in this sense that McLauchlan is right to 
say that the reliance interest is redundant.43 
 It can now be seen that the second misleading aspect of Lord Denning’s judgment in 
Anglia TV was that, when he stated that a claimant could ‘either claim for loss of profits; or 
for his wasted expenditure’, he did not sufficiently strenuously distinguish between net 
profits and what we have termed gross receipts. Citing Cullinane,44 Lord Denning was at 
pains to insist that a claimant cannot claim both its ‘lost profits’ and ‘expenditure which has 
been … wasted’. 45 But, having the overall concept of expectation in mind, Lord Denning did 
not realise that this conception, based on the gross receipts expected at the time of the 
agreement, always involves, as cost of production, expenditures which can be the basis of a 
claim for ‘wasted expenditure’. And it is impossible simply to separate out, and then sum, 
expectation and reliance in a coherent way if we try to work with a conception of expectation 
as gross receipts, for that conception confusingly makes reliance an integral part of 
expectation.46 We must identify expectation as net profit in order to do effect this separation. 
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Let us apply our method to Cullinane which, largely as a result of its citation by Lord 
Denning, is the modern source of the difficulties addressed in this article. We believe our 
method clarifies the conceptual issues in this persistently confusing case, indeed shows them 
to be quite simple, though no method can properly clarify the outcome in the case on the 
basis of the reported facts, which remain ultimately obscure. 
 Cullinane was not a losing contract case, an argument by the defendant that it was 
being rejected.47 Difficulties arose, however, over the combination of expectation and 
reliance in the quantification of damages for beach even of a contract found to be profitable. 
The case arose from the commercially very significant failure of a clay pulverising plant sold 
by the defendant to work at the rate it was found that the defendant had warranted.48 Over 
what, after dispute, was found to be the appropriate period for quantification,49 and also after 
various deductions and adjustments and the addition of interest, the official referee awarded 
total damages of £16,813 7s 2d (approximately £425,000 in 2015).50 This total included a 
claim for ‘loss of profit’ of £8,913 1s, and to this was added a capital investment of £7,370 1s 
5d, which itself was the sum of £3,289 spent in buying the pulverisor, £2,559 1s 5d spent on 
other plant to house it, and £1,522 spent on other ancillary plant; all wasted because of the 
breach. In justification of decision to confine the plaintiff to £8,913 1s, Evershed MR said:51 
I think that the plaintiff could choose to claim on the basis that he had wasted 
capital, and that he ought to be put in the position he would have been in if he had 
never bought this machine; or, alternatively, he was entitled to say: ’I have got the 
machine: what I am claiming is the loss I have suffered because its performance 
falls short of that which was warranted; therefore I have not made profitable sales 
 
the decided law on mitigation. A subsidiary source of confusion in Omak was the definition of a 
straightforward contractual damages claim in a way that made uncomprehending reference to loss 
avoided: Omak [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 155) at [15]; [2010] EWHC 2026 (Comm).  
47 Cullinane [1954] 1 QB 292 at 304. 
48 [1954] 1 QB 292 at 299-300. 
49 [1954] 1 QB 292 at 311-12. 
50 The following figures are taken from the statement of the ‘particulars of damage’ as adjusted by the 
official referee in ibid, at 293-5. In addition to the major adjustment on which we shall focus, the 
damages were further adjusted in a minor way which we shall ignore by the Court of Appeal: [1954] 1 
QB 292 at 307, 309, 312. 




which I would have made, and I claim, accordingly, the loss of such profits’. The 
second alternative being the larger, he was entitled to choose that; but, in my 
judgment, he should be limited to it. By stating that his claim for lost profit was 
limited to three years, he was not, in my judgment, then entitled to claim … both 
for loss of capital and for loss of profit … The result will be that from the figures 
which I have mentioned the first three items [of £3,289 + £2,559 1s 5d + £1,522 = 
£7,370 1s 5d] ought to be omitted. Otherwise, I think that the plaintiff is receiving 
damages, in effect, twice over. The total amount of damages proved which the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover consist of the sum of £8,913 1s. 
 As the (£3,289 + £2,559 1s 5d + £1,522 =) £7,370 1s 5d indisputably is a reliance 
claim, Evershed MR’s reduction of the total damages to (£16,813 7s 2d - £7,370 1s 5d ≈) 
£8,913 1s52 would be justified if ‘loss of profit’ represented gross receipts. The claimant 
always intends gross receipts to amortise the cost of production as well as generate a net 
profit, therefore the claimant always enters into the contract in the belief that r ≤ cp cp will be 
included in gr. As r ≤ cp, ie as r when it arises is all or part of cp, aAdding a claim for 
reliance to a claim based on gross receipts therefore would necessarily have led to ‘double 
recovery’ of reliance. It is not, with respect, entirely possible to understand what the majority 
had in mind, but it seems that they equated any claim for ‘loss of profit’ as a claim for gross 
receipts. In contrast, Morris LJ dissenting identified ‘loss of profit’ as a claim for net profit, 
and, of course, if this is so, then Cullinane is an in principle simple claim for d = e + r and 
therefore £16,813 7s 2d  ≈ . (£8,913 1 s + £7,370 1s 5d ≈) £16,813 7s 2d  should have been 
awarded. The merits of the competing arguments whether ‘loss of profit’ in the case was 
closer to gross receipts or net profit, which we submit are not entirely understandable on the 
ultimately unclear reported facts, though Morris LJ’s views are to be preferred, 53 can be put 
to one side as, like the existence of the Loch Ness monster, a puzzle the answer to which it 
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would be nice to know,54 but which we can manage to get along without knowing.55 A proper 
understanding of Cullinane does, however, show that, in principle, for the combination of e + 
r to produce the correct quantification, it is necessary that e = np.  
 But the fundamental reason that Cullinane exerted what seems such an unfortunate 
influence on Anglia TV, and that the case remains of significance, is that, even accepting d = 
e + r as a universal formula, the difficult point remains that we cannot entirely do away with 
something akin to seeing expectation as gross receipts, for we must fundamentally be guided 
by the overall concept of expectation if we are to observe the principle in Robinson v 
Harman. e + r is the correct methodology, but this methodology is never intended to lead to e 
as the result of quantification but to the overall concept of expectation.56 Coherent 
quantification of the overall concept always involves, using the terms set out here, the use of 
expectation as net profit combined with reliance, ie it involves the use of a second, quite 
different, sense of expectation in order to reach the overall concept of expectation. 
 It is fruitless to say that we should seek to eliminate this use of two senses of 
expectation as both serve an essential purpose. It is therefore necessary to rename at least one 
of them. We therefore submit that the ‘expectation interest’ should continue to be used for the 
net profit concept of expectation and that the overall concept of expectation should be called, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
54 As the miracles that have been wrought by ‘legal archaeological’ scholarship after the fashion of the 
late Brian Simpson even now include making Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161 comprehensible, one 
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56 Of course, e seems to be the result in the case of the apparently pure expectation award, but only, we 




bathetically enough, the ‘overall expectation interest’. If we denote the overall expectation 
interest by E, then E may be substituted for d in (3) d = e + r, and so: 
(10) d = E = e + r 
